Abstract The purpose of this paper is to study 2-person zero-sum stochastic differential games, in which one player is a major one and the other player is a group of N minor agents which are collectively playing, statistically identical and have the same cost-functional. The game is studied in a weak formulation; this means in particular, we can study it as a game of the type "feedback control against feedback control". The payoff/cost functional is defined through a controlled backward stochastic differential equation, for which driving coefficient is assumed to satisfy strict concavity-convexity with respect to the control parameters. This ensures the existence of saddle point feedback controls for the game with N minor agents. We study the limit behavior of these saddle point controls and of the associated Hamiltonian, and we characterize the limit of the saddle point controls as the unique saddle point control of the limit mean-field stochastic differential game.
Introduction
In this paper we study a particular type of 2-person zero-sum stochastic differential games, where one player is a major one, who plays against a group of N collectively acting minor agents which each of them participate with the same percentage and are statistically identical. We study the stochastic differential game in its weak formulation and with a pay-off/cost-functional given through a backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE), which allows to consider the game of the type "feedback control against feedback control". Under suitable assumptions on the driving coefficient of the BSDE we show for the game with N minor agents the existence of saddle point feedback controls, which can be characterized as Stackelberg feedback strategy, where the major player is the leader and the collectively acting minor agents are the follower. We investigate the limit of these saddle point feedback controls and of the associated Hamiltonian of stochastic differential game and characterize the limit saddle point controls as unique saddle point controls of the limit stochastic differential game which turns out to be of mean-field type. sum stochastic differential games with one major player and N symmetric minor players. The stochastic dynamics are non-linear and with mean-field interaction, the forward equation for each player is driven by its own Brownian motion and each player control only his own dynamics and his own running cost; the running cost are non-linear and with mean-field interaction. The study of ε N -Nash equilibriums for the N + 1-person game for large N leads the authors to a strongly coupled stochastic mean-field system composed of a stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation with terminal condition and two McKean-Vlasov equations with stochastic coefficients, describing the state of the major player as well as the measure determining the mean-field behavior of the minor agents. Let us emphasize that the paper [16] represent an extension to the framework of non-linear mean-field stochastic differential equations, which was preceded by papers by Huang [10] but also by Huang together with Caines and Malhamé [11] and with Nourian [17] , in order to mention only these important works of a longer list of papers.
In the present work we study a somehow different framework which, although is related with the works discussed above, in particular with [16] . But unlike [16] we consider the N minor agents as collectively acting, with a common cost functional. This allows to consider the game as 2-person zero-sum stochastic differential game. Moreover, it will be studied in a weak form. Stochastic differential games in the weak form have been studied by Hamadène and Lepeltier [9] but also by Hamadène in different works, see, e.g., [7] and [8] .
In order to be more precise, for independent Brownian motionsW 0 ,W 1 , . . . ,W N and given initial 2 positions x (N ) = (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x N ) we consider the weak solution X (N ) = (X 0,N , X 1,N , . . . , X N,N ) of the following system of dynamics with given feedback controls u = u(X (N ) ) -for the major player and v (N ) (= (v 1 , . . . , v N )) = v(X (N ) ) for the N collectively acting minor agents: We see that here the major player can control his own dynamics X 0,N , and each of the minor agents controls his dynamics but also those of all the other minor agents and, together with the major player; moreover, all players can control the pay-off/cost-functional J(t, x; u, v). While the objective of the major player is to maximize J(t, x; u, v), the collectively acting minor agents want to minimize their common cost functional J(t, x; u, v).
The choice of the weak formulation of the problem of stochastic differential games allows to shift with the help of a Girsanov transformation the doubly controlled drift terms of the dynamics of the game with N collectively acting minor players into the BSDE defining the pay-off/cost functional. This reduces the study of the limit behavior of the game and of the saddle point feedback controls for this game to the investigation of the limit behavior of the corresponding BSDEs with non-feedback controls and the limiting Mean-Field BSDE. In order to guarantee the existence of saddle point controls we impose on the driving coefficient f of the BSDE a strict concavity-convexity assumption with respect to the control parameters (u, v). The specificity of our approach using the Girsanov transformation necessitates the factor ε N which is supposed to be of order O(N −3/4 ), as N → +∞. The problem of a limit approach for mean-field BSDEs as well as mean-field BSDEs themselves were studied by the authors in [3] (together with Djehiche) and in [2] , but unlike here without controls.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 a short recall for the convergence of the above system (1.1) and (1.2) in the case without control will be given. In Section 3 the stochastic differential game with one major player and N collectively acting minor agents is introduced, the assumptions on the coefficients are given and the existence of saddle points controls which are of feedback form is discussed. They are characterized as a Stackelberg feedback strategy. This characterization admits estimates for the saddle point feedback controls which will be used in what follows. Section 5 is devoted to the study of the limit mean-field game. For this the convergence of the saddle point controls for the game with N minor agents is proved and the limit controls are shown to be the unique saddle point controls of the limit game. In order to improve the readability of the work, the proofs of several lemmas have been postponed to the Appendix.
Preliminaries. The N+1 players system without control
In this short section we consider first briefly the case of a "stochastic differential game with N minor agents" without control and recall its limit behavior. We restrict for this to the (particular) case we will need for our discussion in the Sections 3 and 4. The more interested reader is referred to [18] , and for the BSDE part, for instance, to [3] . Let (Ω, F , P ) be a complete probability space, endowed with a sequence of independent d-dimensional Brownian motions W j = (W j s ) s∈[0,T ] , j ≥ 0, where T > 0 is an arbitrarily fixed time horizon. We denote by F = (F t ) t∈[0,T ] the filtration generated by W j , j ≥ 0, and augmented by the P -null sets. Given bounded Lipschitz coefficients b 0 : 
associated with the backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE):
where the functions f : 
Limit behavior of the forward stochastic system
The objective of this section is to discuss briefly the limit behavior of the system (2.1) and (2.2):
as N tends to +∞. The limit behavior of such systems as well as the associated limit McKean-Vlasov SDEs have been already largely discussed in the literature. For completeness we first state the following classical existence and uniqueness result. Proposition 2.1. Under our standard assumptions, that is, the coefficients are bounded and Lipschitz in their variables, we have for any initial datum (t,
, the existence and the uniqueness of the solution
denotes the space of all continuous F-adapted, R d -valued processes which supremum of the Euclidean norm over the interval [t, T ] is square integrable.
Let us now suppose that (x
In order to justify the choice of this condition, we let P 2 (R d ) be the space of the Borel probability measures on R d with finite second moments. Wishing that the convergence of the above system (2.1)-(2.2) can be measured in terms of the (Monge-Kantorovich-)Wasserstein distance d 2 of second order,
We define ν N = 1 N N j=1 δ xj , with δ xj denoting the Dirac measure with mass in x j . Given another probability ν ∈ P 2 (R d ), the convergence d 2 (ν N , ν) → 0, as N → +∞, is equivalent to the weak convergence of ν N to ν as well as that of their second moments. Preferring, for simplicity, the choice ν = δ x , for some x ∈ R d , the convergence d 2 (ν N , ν) → 0 is equivalent to (2.4). The L 2 -limit system of the above systems of SDEs (2.1)-(2.2) (see Proposition 2.2) is given by
is the conditional distribution law of X 
. By L we denote the second order operator
defined for probability measures µ on
, and by L(x, µ) * we denote its dual operator applying to the probability measures on R d . It is well known that µ = (µ s ) s∈[t,T ]) can be characterized as the weak solution of the PDE with stochastic coefficients
denotes the space of C 2 -functions with compact support in R d ). Let us first remark the following proposition. Proposition 2.2. Under our standard assumptions the above system (2.5) has a unique solution
Moreover, (2.5) can be equivalently rewritten in the following form: 10) where s runs the time interval [t, T ) and ℓ j ≥ 1 is arbitrary but different from j, j ≥ 0.
The equivalence between the first equation of (2.5) and that of (2.10) is evident, since we can replace X 1 in (2.6) by X ℓ1 without changing µ s . The equivalence between the second equation of (2.5) and that of (2.10) follows from the fact that X ℓj defined by (2.10) is F 
Proof. The proof is a direct consequence of the above observation. Indeed, we have
it's a finite-dimensional SDE with Lipschitz coefficients, and standard estimates to show the existence and the uniqueness. Once having the processes X 0 , X 1 and X 2 , we can obtain the unique solution processes X j , j ≥ 3, in (2.10) by choosing, for instance, ℓ j = 1.
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The limit system (2.5), or equivalently (2.10), is related with (2.1) and (2.2) through the following convergence property. Proposition 2.3. Under our standard assumptions we have that, for all m ≥ 1, there is some constant
For the reader's convenience we give the proof in Appendix 1. By adapting the argument of the proof of the above proposition we also see the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. Under our standard assumptions we have, for all bounded Lipschitz functions h :
, and for all m ≥ 1, the existence of a real constant C m such that, for all N ≥ 1, 13) and
(2.14)
After having reviewed the limit behavior of the forward equation (2.1)-(2.2) let us come now to the backward one.
Limit behavior of the backward stochastic differential equations
In this subsection we discuss briefly the limit behavior of the solution ( (2.15) as N tends to infinity, and we show (Y N , Z 0,N ) converges to the unique solution ( (2.16) and Z ℓ,N converges to 0, for every ℓ ≥ 1 (recall that µ s (dy) = P {X
We refer to the fact that it is by now standard that under our assumptions on the coefficients the BSDEs (2.15) and (2.16) have a unique solution. In analogy to the forward system we also see that the limit BSDE (2.16) can be equivalently written in the form 17) for any ℓ ≥ 1. Moreover, we can have the following statement on convergence:
Proposition 2.4. Under our standard assumptions on the coefficients we have for all m ≥ 1 the existence of a constant C m such that
For the reader's convenience the proof is given in the Appendix 2.
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3 The stochastic differential game with N+1 participants
Let U = R k be the control state space for the major player and V = R m for the minor agents. To simplify the notation, we will suppose from now on that the dimension d used in the preceding section is equal to 1.
Our objective is to study the limit behavior of the stochastic differential game between a major player and N collectively behaving minor agents, when N → +∞.
We denote by F N the filtration generated by the Brownian motion W (N 
of the major player, and feedback controls
for the N minor agents, the dynamics of the major player X 0,N and those of the minor agents X ℓ,N are defined by the system
And the nonlinear payoff/cost functional is defined through the BSDE
, and ε N > 0 is a factor which converges to zero, as N tends to ∞ (its role will be discussed later). We want to study the above system in a weak sense, i.e., we allow the driving N -dimensional Brownian motion (W 0 , . . . ,W N ) to depend on the control processes. Assuming for simplicity that σ 0 ≡ 1, σ 1 ≡ 1, we use the Girsanov transformation
)ds, in order to reduce the study of the above system to the resolution of the following simplified system: 
as long as our saddle point controls are feedback controls. Our objective is to study this latter stochastic differential game and its limit behavior as N → +∞. In order to abbreviate the notation, given
we denote the driving coefficient of the BSDE in (3.3) by
Let us make throughout our paper the following assumptions on the coefficients involved in the definition of the Hamiltonian H N :
We also observe that from our assumptions on the function f we get
Hence, taking into account the above assumption on the coefficients b 0 and b 1 , we see that, for all ξ
The above properties of H N allow to apply the classical result on the existence and uniqueness of the solution for BSDE:
. In order to indicate that this solution is associated with the controls (u, v (N ) ), we also write
As already explained, we have two objectives: First we want to study for each fixed N ≥ 1 saddle point controls for our stochastic differential game with N collectively acting minor agents playing against one major player, i.e, we are looking for a couple of controls (u
In a second step we are interested in the limit behavior of the saddle point controls (u N , v (N ) ) when N tends to +∞, and we want to characterize the limit controls as saddle point controls for the limit stochastic differential game.
Let us begin with the study of the existence of saddle point controls and its characterization for the game with N + 1 participants. For this end, we have first to point out some useful properties of the Hamiltonian H N . So we observe that, as a direct consequence of the above assumptions on our coefficients, we have
(3.8)
N → R has a unique saddle point. More precisely, there exists a couple of Borel measurable feedback
However, the special form of our Hamiltonian H N allows to compute the form of this saddle point in a more precise manner. For this end, we letṽ
Let us also consider a measurable functionũ
For the above introduced functions we have the following result:
Lemma 3.1. Under our standard assumptions the unique saddle point (ū
i.e., it corresponds to a Stackelberg feedback strategy for a 2-player zero-sum game with the major player as leader and the collectively acting minor agents as followers; it is the optimal feedback strategy for the major player, if the collectively acting minor agents react in an optimal way.
For the convenience of the reader we give the proof in Appendix 3.
With the help of our standard assumptions and Lemma 3.1 we can now derive the following estimates for our saddle point controls:
For the proof of this lemma the reader is referred to Appendix 3. With the help of the couple of feedback saddle point controls (u
which has the following properties:
2) There is a constant
The proof of this lemma follows immediately from the assumptions on b 0 and b 1 , and our estimates (3.6) for f , combined with the estimates given in Lemma 3.2. Consequently, we can have the following result: By putting
N (abusing notation we use nearly the same notations as for the corresponding feedback controls). The following statement is now a standard statement following from the uniqueness of the solution of BSDE in (3.3), from (3.9) and the comparison theorem for BSDEs.
Proposition 3.2. The above introduced couple of admissible controls
. More precisely, we even have
4 The limit game
The limit backward stochastic differential equation
After having shown in the preceding subsection the existence of saddle point controls (u
N for the game with N + 1 agents, the objective of this subsection is to introduce a BSDE, for which we will prove later that it is the limit of the BSDEs for N + 1 participants, if the saddle point controls are played, and we will study the associated saddle point control processes for this limit BSDE.
Let us begin with the introduction of the Hamiltonian for our limit BSDE. For this end, we observe that Assumption Ai) allows to select a measurable function v :
To shorten the notation, we identify in what follows ξ = (x 0 , x 1 , y, z 0 , 0) with (x 0 , x 1 , y, z 0 ) and we put
. From a straight-forward computation using the assumptions Ai) and Aii) on f , we obtain Lemma 4.1. Under our standard assumptions on f , we have:
With the help of the function fv we introduce the Hamiltonian
We observe that H(s, x 0 , y, z 0 , u) is a continuous random field which, for every fixed (x 0 , y, z 0 , u), is F W 0 -progressively measurable. Moreover, we have the following further properties of H: Lemma 4.2. 1) There exists some constant C ∈ R such that, P -a.s., for all ξ, ξ
2) P -almost all trajectories of H(s, ξ, u) are continuously differentiable in u, and
for all ξ := (x 0 , y, z 0 ), where, with our convention for ξ, (ξ,
For the proof the reader is referred to Appendix 4. A consequence of the preceding lemma is the strict concavity of the function H(s, ξ, .) :
3 and uniform over Ω. This implies that the random field u :
→ U has the following properties:
for some constant C ∈ R not depending on
For the proof the reader is referred to Appendix 4. Let us now introduce the Hamiltonian of our limit BSDE: We put
Then we get immediately from the Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 that, for some constant
Consequently, as H(., ξ) is F 
The convergence to the limit game
The main result in this subsection concerns the convergence of the pay-off/cost functional of the game with N + 1 participants under saddle point controls to the solution of BSDE (4.12). More precisely, we have
be the unique solution of the BSDE (4.12) and
ii) E[(
(4.13)
Taking into account that we have supposed that 
The proof of the theorem is prepared by two auxiliary lemmas. The first lemma analyzes the limit behavior of the couple of saddle point controls 14) as the number N of collectively playing minor agents tends to infinity. Putting
(recall the definition of u(.) by (4.8) and that of v(.) by (4.1)), we can establish the following result:
Lemma 4.5. Under our standard assumption of Lipschitz continuity on the coefficients we have
where, for all m ≥ 1, the remainder R N s satisfies the following estimate for some constant C m only depending on m:
The proof of this lemma is presented in Appendix 5. The above lemma allows to characterize the limit behavior of the Hamiltonian
Lemma 4.6. Under the standard assumptions on the coefficients the following estimate with some suitable constant C holds true:
As in Lemma 4.5, the remainder R N s satisfies the following estimate:
The proof of this lemma is given in Appendix 5.
With the both preceding lemmas we are now able to prove Theorem 4.1. 
Proof. (of Theorem 4.1). Recall that (Y
From Lemma 2.1 we know that
Consequently, Lemma 4.6 yields that, for ρ > 0 small (we will specify ρ later) and a constant C ρ depending on ρ,
where the estimate of the remainder R N r , r ∈ [t, T ], is given by Lemma 4.6. Obviously,
and it is here, where we have to use our assumption that ε N = O(N −3/4 ), as N → ∞. Indeed, this assumption allows to get
for a sufficiently small chosen ρ > 0. Hence, with such a choice of ρ we obtain
Consequently, from Gronwall's inequality we have for all N ≥ 1, P -a.s.,
i.e., estimate (4.13)-i) is proved. It still remains to show ii). For this end, we consider the difference between the BSDEs solved by (Y N , Z (N ) ) and by (Y , Z 0 ), and we apply to this difference the Burkholder-DavisGundy inequality. Thus, using Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 4.6, we get, for every m ≥ 1 and some constant C m depending on m, After having proved Theorem 4.1, we can combine it with Lemma 4.5, in order to improve its statement concerning the convergence of the saddle point controls of the game with N collectively acting minor agents, when N tends to +∞. Then we obtain easily the following result: Theorem 4.2. Under our standard assumptions as well as the condition that ε N = O(N −3/4 ), as N → +∞, we have that for all m ≥ 1 there is a constant C m ∈ R, such that for all N ≥ N 0 ,
) to the processes u and v j , respectively, statement ii) says that, if we identify in the limit the collectively acting minor agents with a limit player, whose dynamics is
Proof. Statement i) is a direct consequence from Lemma 4.5 combined with Theorem 4.1, while statement ii) of the theorem follows easily from i) and Lemma 2.1.
Recall the definition of u and also that 
Our objective is to characterize the couple (u, v) obtained in Theorem 4.2 as saddle point control for a limit 2-person zero-sum stochastic differential game.
In order to define this 2-person zero-sum game, we introduce the function
We consider as space of admissible controls for Player 1 the set U = L 
N is the filtration generated by the Brownian motions W 0 , W 1 , . . . , W N and augmented by all P -null sets). Given a couple of admissible controls (u, v) ∈ U × V, we consider the BSDE -the dynamics of Player 2 (the collectively acting minor agents who, in the averaging limit, amalgamate to a single player).
From our standard assumptions on the functions f and b 0 we have x 1 , u, v) , y, y ′ and z 0 , z ′ 0 . Consequently, from standard BSDE arguments we have Lemma 4.7. Under our standard assumptions, for any (u, v) ∈ U × V, BSDE (4.27) has a unique solution Proof. The fact that BSDE (4.27) has a unique solution (
is an easy consequence of the above properties of the function F .
Indeed, thanks to them, given (u, v) ∈ U × V, the coefficient 
The stated result follows now from the uniqueness of the solution for BSDE (4.12).
With the help of BSDE (4.27) let us now introduce the pay-off/cost functional for our 2-person zerosum limit game:
Player 1 (the major player) wants to maximize his payoff J(u, v) through the controls u ∈ U, while Player 2-the amalgamated collectively acting minor agents-wants to minimize the loss J(u, v) by using the controls v ∈ V.
For the such defined game we have the following characterization:
Theorem 4.3. The limit (u, v) ∈ U × V in the sense of Theorem 4.2 of the couples of saddle point controls (u N , v (N ) ) of the game with N minor agents is a saddle point control for the limit stochastic differential game defined above:
i.e., in particular, it holds
Proof.
Step 1:
s , s ∈ [t, T ], P -a.s., v ∈ V. Indeed, given any v ∈ V, we have
This allows to conclude with the help of the comparison theorem for BSDEs.
Step 2:
Let u ∈ U. Then, using the definition (u s ) 0≤s≤T and (v s ) 0≤s≤T in (4.15) and (4.24), respectively, we have From the properties of f, b 0 and those ofū,v we obtain
we have from Lemma 2.1
for all N ≥ 1, s ∈ [t, T ], x 0 , y, z 0 ∈ R and u ∈ K, where K ⊂ U is an arbitrary compact subset of U . Consequently, for all u ∈ U, it follows from (4.30) and (4.32) that Thus, using the uniform Lipschitz continuity of f and b 0 (x 0 , x 1 , z 0 )z 0 in (y, z 0 ), we get The latter equality follows from the fact that, if z ℓ = 0, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ N , then the minimizer v(ξ, u) of f (ξ, u, .) (see (4.1)) and the minimizer v N (ξ, u) in (3.11) satisfy the relation
Therefore, using definition (4.26) of F , we can write 
, and we have used Lemma 2.1 for the latter estimate. Hence, combining the above estimates of Step 2, we get
But, since due to Lemma 4.5 (recall that u
and, thanks to Theorem 4.1, as N → ∞,
(4.43)
Consequently, from the comparison theorem for BSDEs we have
and the proof is complete now.
While we have seen in Theorem 4.3 that (u, v) is a saddle point control of our limit 2-person zero-sum game, it turns out that it is even the unique saddle point control. Indeed, we have the following uniqueness result:
Proof. Let (u ′ , v ′ ), (u ′′ , v ′′ ) ∈ U × V be two couples of saddle point controls in the above sense.
Step
s., and it follows that
, and
Indeed, putting
, defines an admissible control in U, and
Consequently, the comparison theorem yields Yũ
But, since on the other hand,
, it follows from the converse comparison theorem that Yũ
But this implies
from where we see that Y
On the other hand, let us also observe that, from the definition of F and the assumptions on f ,
Step 2. Let v ∈ V. Following the argument in Step 1, but with putting
, we haveṽ ∈ V, and
Consequently, from the comparison theorem it follows that Y
, and since on the
Thus,
, dsdP-a.e., and
On the other hand, since
∈ U × V be two couples of saddle point controls. Then, combining our results from the Steps 1 and 2 we have
, and the uniqueness of the semimartingale decomposition of this process
dsdP-a.e., and also
But this means that also u 
, and from the uniqueness of the semimartingale decomposition of this process we get Z
Since, on the other hand, for v = v ′′ in Step 2,
it follows that
), dsdP-a.e. But due to Step 2, the unique minimum point is v
Since we have already shown that u ′ s = u ′′ s , dsdP-a.e., we conclude that the saddle point controls (u ′ , v ′ ) and (u ′′ , v ′′ ) coincide.
Appendix

Appendix 1
Appendix 1 is devoted to the proof of Proposition 2.3.
Proof. (of Proposition 2.3)
. Without loss of the generality, we may suppose that b 0 = 0 and b 1 = 0. We note that with this convention and with the notation
from where we deduce
where
, and e j = (δ j,k ) k≥1 is the element of ℓ 2 with δ j,j = 1 and δ j,k = 0, k = j. Consequently, due to the Burkholder-Davis-Gundy Inequality, for some constant C m ∈ R which can vary from line to line but doesn't depend on N ,
is the quadratic variation process of the martingale
. Hence, with the notation
we have 
The following estimates of J 
Proof. We give the proof only for
T ] is analogous. For simplifying the argument we assume that d = 1. For the multi-dimensional case d > 1 the random variable ζ 1,j,ℓ (r) is matrix-valued and the argument we develop shall be applied component-wise. For our argument we will need the set
Remark that the cardinal number of Γ m,N,j satisfies the estimate
for some C m ∈ R not depending on N .
We begin the proof of the lemma by remarking that knowing
In virtue of the boundedness of σ 1 and the estimate of the cardinal number of Γ m,N,j this yields 9) for some C m ∈ R independent of N ≥ 1. The statement of the lemma follows easily from this.
Appendix 2
This appendix is devoted to the proof of Proposition 2.4.
Proof. (of Proposition 2.4). Taking the difference between the BSDE for Y
N and that for Y we obtain 
for some constant C m independent of N . Furthermore, again from Proposition 2.3 we have
As concerns the convergence of 
The above estimates allow now to get by a BSDE standard argument that
The proof is complete.
Appendix 3
Proof. (of Lemma 3.1). For convenience we omit the dependence on ξ (N ) , we deduce from the fact that (u N , v (N ) ) is the saddle point of H N and the definition of (ũ N ,ṽ (N ) ) at one hand
Consequently,ũ N , u N ∈ U are both maximum points of the strict concave function H N (., v (N ) ) (see (3.8) ). This impliesũ N = u N . On the other hand, using this equality we have
i.e.,ṽ (N ) (ũ N ) ∈ V N is a minimum point of the strict convex function H N (u N , .) (see (3.8) again), and it follows thatṽ
We continue with the proof of Lemma 3.2.
Proof. (of Lemma 3.2). Let ξ
and, given an arbitrary u ∈ U ,ṽ N,ℓ :=ṽ N (ξ 17) and using that
we deduce
and sincev
On the other hand, from (5.20),
we see that
from where, since 0 < µ < λ, we get that 
we get from Assumption Ai), for all u,ũ ∈ U,
and, consequently,
where η ℓ := (x 0 , x ℓ , y, z 0 ),η ℓ := (x 0 ,x ℓ ,ỹ,z 0 ). With a similar argument, using again Assumption Ai) but exploiting now the strict concavity of f in u, we deduce from
) and using (5.25) as well as µ/λ < 1, we obtain
and combining the latter result with (5.25) we have 
This proves the Lipschitz continuity of u(s, .), uniformly with respect to s ∈ [0, T ].
26
Appendix 5
Let us begin with the proof of Lemma 4.5.
Proof. (of Lemma 4.5).
Step 1. Recalling the definition ofṽ N in (3.11) and that of v in (4.1), we see that
On the other hand, from (5.25),
Step 2. The objective of this step is to estimate the difference between the controls u N and u. Let us use here in our computations the notations ξ := (x 0 , y, z 0 ) and (ξ, 
On the other hand, from the definition of u N as one of the both saddle point feedback controls for H N (ξ (N ) , ., .), from Lemma 3.1 and from (5.28) we obtain 
Let us estimate the expressions I N k , 1 ≤ k ≤ 4. We begin with that of I N 1 .
• Estimate for I N 1 : By standard estimates using our assumptions on f we have
(recall that we have supposed that µ < λ). Consequently,
(5.32)
• Estimate for I N 2 : From (4.3) and Assumption Aii) on D u f we have, for arbitrarily small given δ > 0 and a constant C δ only depending on δ,
(5.33)
• Estimate for I N 3 : Using the Lipschitz continuity of z 0 → b 0 (x 0 , x 1 , z 0 )z 0 , uniformly with respect to (x 0 , x 1 ), we obtain that for any small δ > 0 there is a constant C δ such that
we can use (2.14), in order to deduce that for all m ≥ 1, there is some constant C m such that
• Estimate for I N 4 : Obviously, for all δ > 0 there is C δ > 0 such that
s -measurable, we obtain similarly to the estimate for I N 3 from (2.14) that, for all m ≥ 1 there is some C m ∈ R with
Now, choosing δ = Step 3. Basing on the results of above steps we prove now the limit behavior of the controls process v Recalling that the functions x ℓ → f (x 0 , x l , y, z 0 , u), and x l → b 0 (x 0 , x l , z 0 )z 0 are Lipschitz, uniformly with respect to (x 0 , y, z 0 ), and that |u s | ≤ C, we can apply Lemma 2.1, and we get for The statement of the lemma follows now easily from the latter estimates and (5.48).
